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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Can a conversion occur when the party claiming

the conversion had no possessory interest at the time of the
alleged conversion?
2.

Can a conversion occur when the alleged converter

rightfully came into possession of the property in question and
no demand was made to return the property|prior to the alleged
conversion?
3.

Can a conversion occur when the alleged converter

rightfully came into possession of the property in question
and, upon demand from a secured party, thi alleged converter
turned the property over to the secured pdrty?
4.

Can a party raise a claim of unjust enrichment on

appeal when such claim was not made in th^ Amended Complaint
nor argued in the District Court?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE)
Plaintiff-Appellant, Petty Motor Lease Co. ("Petty"),
brought this action against Defendant-Respondent, Masonry
Equipment Supply Co., et al. ("Masonry Equipment"), for the
alleged conversion of a Swinger 300 Forklilft ("subject
forklift").

Petty's Amended Complaint alleges that Masonry

Equipment converted the subject forklift b{y purchasing it
subject to Petty's U.C.C. security interest from CS&G Masonry

("CS&G"), and by using and disposing of the subject forklift,
despite Masonry Equipment's lack of knowledge of CS&G's payment
default which occurred in February 1981*
After the submission of briefs and oral argument, the
district court granted Masonry Equipment's Motion for Summary
Judgment and denied Petty's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Petty's subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied.

Judgment was entered February 8, 1985.

Notice of

Appeal was filed March 5, 1985.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On February 21, 1978, Petty sold the subject

forklift to CS&G pursuant to the "Lease" document included in
the addendum as Exhibit "A".
2.

(R. 76)

On March 31, 1978, Petty filed a UCC-1 Financing

Statement with the State of Utah listing itself as a seller or
purchase money lender of the subject forklift.

A copy of the

UCC-1 Form filed with the State of Utah is included in the
addendum as Exhibit "B".
3.

(R. 76)

On August 28, 1979, CS&G conveyed the subject

forklift to Masonry Equipment with representations that the
subject forklift had been paid for in full.

As shown by the

payment record included in the addendum as Exhibit "C", at the
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time of this conveyance CS&G was not in default on its
agreement with Petty.
4.

(R. 76)

In February, 1981, CS&G defaulted on its

agreement with Petty.

Masonry Equipment Was not aware of this

default until February of 1983, when Petty demanded return of
the subject forklift.
5.

(R. 76-77)

On February 10, 1983, Petty (sent Masonry

Equipment a letter demanding that Masonry (Equipment convey to
Petty the forklift which Petty had sold to CS&G.

A copy of

said letter is included in the addendum a^ Exhibit "D".
Pursuant to this demand, Masonry Equipment reobtained
possession of the subject forklift and tendered it to Petty on
April 27, 1983.

Petty accepted possession) of the subject

forklift on May 11, 1984.
6.

(R. 76-77)

The subject forklift did not change in value

between February, 1983 and June, 1983.

(Rl. 78)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

At no time did all of the prerequisites for a

conversion action by Petty against Masonry Equipment exist.
Accordingly, Masonry Equipment was entitled to retain the
subject forklift until (1) Petty had a riglfit to possess the
subject forklift, (2) Petty made demand up0n Masonry Equipment
to return the subject forklift, and (3) Maionry Equipment
-3-

refused to deliver the subject forklift*

No conversion

occurred in this case since Petty did not obtain a right to
possess the subject forklift until CS&G's default in 1981,
eighteen months after Masonry Equipment rightfully obtained
possession of the subject forklift and since Petty chose not to
exercise this right until 1983 when it made demand for and
received the forklift.
II.

Petty has no proper claim for unjust enrichment

and since it failed to raise this claim in the District Court.
III. Masonry Equipment was not unjustly enriched since
any benefit it obtained from the subject forklift was obtained
as a result of its rightful purchase of the subject forklift
from CS&G.
IV.

Replevin damages may not properly be granted

Petty since Masonry Equipment did not wrongfully take nor
detain Petty's property.
ARGUMENT
I.

PETTY HAS NO CLAIM FOR CONVERSION AGAINST MASONRY
EQUIPMENT.
A.

Masonry Equipment took the Subject Forklift
Subject to Petty's Security Interest.

When Masonry Equipment purchased the subject forklift,
it did so without knowledge of Petty's security interest in the
forklift.

By reason of Petty's UCC-1 filing, however, Masonry
-4-

Equipment took the subject forklift subject to Petty1s security
interest.

Masonry Equipment violated non^ of Petty1s rights by

thus taking possession of the subject forklift, but did face
the risk that a default on the part of CS&G would give Petty
the right to demand delivery of the subject forklift.

Clark

Jewelers v. Satterthwaite, 8 Kan. App. 2d 569, 662 P.2 1301
(1983).
B.

No Conversion Occurs with Respect to Property
"until the Plaintiff (1) Gair|s a Right to Possess
the Property, (2) Makes Demand for Return of the
Property and (3) Is Refused the Return of the
Property.

The essential elements of an action for conversion are
set forth in Clark Jewelers v. Satterthwai te, 8 Kan. App. 2d
569, 662 P.2d 1301 (1983).

In Clark Jewel ers a third party

named Graber obtained possession of a diamond bridal set from a
debtor subject to a creditor's security irjterest.

In analyzing

the respective rights of the parties, the court stated the
prerequisites to a claim for conversion:
Because it appears that Graber rightfully
came into possession of the bridal set, she
was entitled to retain possession) of that
property until such time as plaintiff had
gained the right to repossess, had made
demand upon her, and she had refused to
deliver the bridal set to plainti Iff. Then
and only then could Graber have committed
the tort of conversion. See Pros ser, Law of
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Torts, § 15, pp 89-90 (4th ed. 1971);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 237 (1965).
Id, at 1304-1305? see also Hogan v. Maxey, 121 Ga. App. 490,
174 S.E.2d 208, 210 (1970) (where possession of property was
lawfully acquired, proof of a demand for its return by the
entity entitled to it and refusal by the defendant is a
condition precedent to recovery).

Accordingly, in the instant

action, no conversion could have occurred with respect to the
subject forklift until Petty (1) had gained a right to possess
the property, (2) had made demand for return of the property,
and (3) was refused the return of the property.
In Frisco Joes, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327, Utah
(1977) this Court applied this principle.

In that case this

Court held that a cause of action for conversion did not exist
because the plaintiffs, at the time of the alleged conversion,
did not have a right to possess the property in question.
Similarly, in this case, at the time Masonry Equipment bought
the subject forklift from CS&G, Petty, as a secured creditor
under the Uniform Commercial Code, had no possessory interest
in the subject forklift.

Petty8s right to take possession of

the forklift accrued only after default in payment occurred in
1981.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-503 (1981).

Petty, however,

chose not to exercise its possessory rights until 1983 when it

-6-

demanded return of the forklift.
by returning the forklift.

Masonry Equipment responded

As a secured qreditor making demand

on a party who took the forklift subject to Petty1s security
interest, Petty received from Masonry Equipment exactly what it
had a right to receive. No further recovery is justified.
The rule that a demand is a pre-condition for an
action in conversion is not new.

In Tompklins v. Fonda Glove

Lining Co., 188 N.Y. 261, 80 N.E. 933, reh'g denied, 188 N.Y.
635, 81 N.E. 1177 (1907), a vendor brought a conversion action
against a transferee of property conditionally sold.

In that

case the court held that where the vendors^ after the default
of their vendee in the payment of the purchase money allowed
the vendee to continue in possession of the property, they
could not charge the vendee with conversion until after
demand.

The Tompkins court stated:
The universal rule in this state £s that,
where property comes lawfully intcf) the
possession of a party, he cannot lt>e charged
for a conversion in failing to surrender it
to the owner unless a demand therefore is
made • • • •

80 N.E. at 934; see generally Annot., 59 A.L.R. 134-148 (1929);
see also Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28, 34 (1874) ("The rule is
a reasonable and just one, that an innocenti purchaser of
personal property from a wrong-doer shall first be informed of
-7-

the defect in his title, and have an opportunity to deliver the
property to the true owner, before he shall be made liable as a
tort feasor for a wrongful conversion").
The court in Production Credit Association v.
Nowatzski, 90 Wise, 2d 344, 280 N.W.2d 118, 123 (1979) held
that a conversion of secured farm equipment occurred when the
possessor of the secured property refused to surrender the
property at the demand of the secured party.
Where . . . there is no wrongful taking and
the defendant rightfully comes into
possession of the chattels, a demand by the
rightful owner and a refusal by the alleged
tort feasor are necessary elements of the
tort.
Id. quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts 89 (4th ed.1971);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 237 (1965).
Consistent with the general rule recently reiterated
in Clark Jewelers and Nowatzski, no cause of action for the
tort of conversion exists in the instant action.

Once Petty

informed Masonry Equipment of CS&G's default and demanded
return of the subject forklift, Masonry Equipment repurchased
the subject forklift from Red Ball and tendered the subject
forklift to Petty.

Given the fact that the subject forklift

was in Red Ball's possession at the time of Petty1s demand for
return, Masonry Equipment's recovery and delivery of the
-8-

subject forklift was accomplished within a| reasonable time. As
Professor Prosser noted:
Not every failure to deliver upon demand,
however, will constitute a conversion. The
defendant does not become a convejrter when
the goods are no longer in his po|ssession or
control, so that he is unable to (comply with
the demand.
. . and even when he has
possession, a qualified refusal, for a
reasonable purpose and for a reasonable
length of time, is not a conversi on.
Prosser, supra at 90.
The three prerequisites to an act ion for conversion
thus did not occur in this case.

Eighteen months after Masonry

Equipment rightfully came into possession of the forklift in
1979, Petty obtained a possessory right to the forklift when
CS&G defaulted on its obligations.

Petty those not to assert

that possessory right, however, until 1983 when it told Masonry
Equipment of the default and demanded return of the subject
forklift.

But the third prerequisite, the refusal of Masonry

Equipment to return the forklift, never occurred.

To the

contrary, after negotiations to settle the matter failed,
Masonry Equipment reobtained possession of the forklift and
tendered it to Petty.

Only if the delay fitom February to April

in tendering the forklift is regarded as a refusal did a
conversion take place.

The finding of such a conversion,
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would result in only nominal damages, however, since the
evidence in the record is uncontroverted that the forklift did
not change in value between February and April.

(R.78)

In the case at bar, the Record on Appeal and the
foregoing discussion of case law clearly establishes that an
action for conversion does not exist against Masonry Equipment
in connection with the subject forklift.

Accordingly, Masonry

Equipment requests that the Order granting its Motion for
Summary Judgment be affirmed.
C.

Appellant's Arguments are Without Merit and are
Unsupported by Case Law.
1.

CS&G8s Sale of the Subject Forklift to
Masonry Equipment Did Not Constitute a
Default.

Pursuant to the lease agreement whereby CS&G purchased
the subject forklift from Petty, CS&G

,8

agree[d] to continually

maintain said property in good condition and repair."
"A", 1f 3)

(Exhibit

In an unsuccessful attempt to establish a right to

possession of the subject forklift prior to CS&G's actual
default, Petty suggests that CS&G's conveyance of the subject
forklift to Masonry Equipment constituted a breach of the lease
agreement.

Such an argument is clearly without merit.

Record contains no evidence that the conveyance of CS&G
constituted a breach of the lease agreement.
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Masonry

The

Equipment, a recognized dealer of forklifts, not only
specifically deals in new and used forklifts, but also provides
forklift maintenance and repair service a^ an integral part of
its business.

The conveyance of the forklift to Masonry

Equipment cannot properly be viewed as a breach of the lease
agreement.
Petty also argues that the conveyance of the subject
forklift to Masonry Equipment constitutes a breach of paragraph
7 of the lease agreement which states that

11

[u]pon expiration

or termination of this agreement User shall surrender the unit
to Owner in good mechanical condition and repair
(Exhibit "A", 1F 7)

....

The Record contains nol evidence that Petty

has alleged or elected an expiration or termination of its
agreement with CS&G.

Since no expiration or termination has

occurred, Petty cannot successfully argue piat paragraph 7 has
been breached.
Petty relies upon the decisions o^X Empire Fire and
Marine Insurance Co. v. First National Bank, 26 Ariz. App. 157,
546 P. 2d 1166, 1168 (1976), and America National Bank and Trust
Co. v, Robertson, 384 So. 2d 1122, 1123 (A^La. Civ. App. 1980)
in support of its argument that CS&G's conveyance of the
subject forklift to Masonry Equipment constituted a default.
Such reliance is misplaced.

In both cases^ the debtors were in

-11-

default in making payments prior to the collateral being
conveyed.

Both creditors thus had immediate possessory

interests in the property*
What Petty is seeking, after the fact, is a way of
making CS&G's transfer of CS&G's rights in the collateral an
implicit default of the lease agreement.

The Uniform

Commercial Code, however, does not allow such of result. Utah
Code Ann., § 70A-9-311 (1953) providess
The debtor's rights in collateral may be
voluntarily or involuntarily transferred (by
waiy of sale, creation of a security
interest, attachment, levy, garnishment or
other judicial process) notwithstanding a
provision in the security agreement
prohibiting any transfer or making the
transfer constitute a default.
CS&G's sale of the subject forklift to Masonry Equipment cannot
constitute a default of the lease agreement, nor a conversion
of the property.

Petty cannot escape the fact that a default

did not occur until 1981 and that Masonry Equipment therefore
rightfully took possession of the property in 1979.
2.

Masonry Equipment's Use of the Subject
Forklift and Sale to Red Ball Did Not
Constitute a Conversion.

The cases are clear that the mere existence of a
perfected security interest does not create a conversion every

-12-

time the subject collateral changes hands*

Subsequent

purchasers merely take the property subject to Petty1s first
priority interest.

In Pearson v. Picco, 1|81 Wash. 613, 44 P. 2d

186, 188-89 (1935), the court recognized that the conditional
sales vendee in that case had "an interest which he could
assign, sell, mortgage, or give away subjelct to the rights of
the conditional sales vendor or the latter1s assignee."
Nonetheless, Petty argues that Masonry Equipment's
resale of the subject forklift to Red Ball constituted a
conversion.

The requirements of a demand Ifor return of the

collateral and a refusal to do so protect the person who
rightfully comes into possession of the collateral against the
injustices that would result were Petty1s argument accepted.
In addition, Petty argues that Makonry Equipment
interfered with Petty1s rights by using th^ subject forklift.
As set forth in the Record, Masonry Equipment was unaware of
CS&G's default until February of 1983, at \|*hich time Petty made
demand for the return of the forklift.

(Rl 76-77)

Masonry

Equipment was at all times legally entitled to possess and
authorized to use the subject forklift as it saw fit. As
discussed above, absent a demand and subsequent refusal to
I
return the equipment, Masonry Equipment's possession cannot be
deemed unlawful. Further, Masonry Equipment's conveyance of
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the subject forklift to Red Ball occurred in May of 1981. Red
Ball, another good faith purchaser, was also legally entitled
to the possession of the subject forklift subject to Petty1s
security interest, which was not exercised until Petty made
demand for the return of the subject forklift.

Upon Petty1s

demand and in accordance with Petty1s security interest,
Masonry Equipment recovered the subject forklift from Red Ball
and tendered delivery to Petty.
Petty cites two cases which suggest that a debtor's
conveyance of secured property, without the prior consent of
the creditor, constitutes a conversion by way of the debtor's
unauthorized use of the property.

See Colorado Bank and Trust

Co. v. Western Slope Investments, Inc., 36 Colo. App. 149, 539
P.2d 501 (1975); and United States v. Hughes, 340 F. Supp* 539
(N.D. Miss. 1972).

The instant action is clearly

distinguishable from those decisions.

In both those cases, the

agreements contained provisions requiring written consent prior
to the debtors' conveyance or disposal of the collateral.

No

such provision exists in Petty's lease agreement with CS&G.
Only after a demand by Petty and an absolute refusal by Masonry
Equipment or Red Ball to return the subject forklift would the
use of the property become unauthorized.

The facts of this

case dictate that no such unauthorized use occurred and
therefore no conversion resulted.
-14-

II.

PETTY HAS NO CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
A.

Petty1s Claim for Unjust Enrichment Should not be
Considered by this Court since Petty Failed to
Raise this Claim in the District Court.

In its brief. Petty for the first time in this action
claims entitlement to "restitution" as a result of "unjust
enrichment."

The law is well established that an appellant

cannot, on appeal, raise new theories and claims for relief.
General Appliance Corporation v. Haw, Inc. , 30 Utah 2d 238, 516
P.2d 346 (1973) (theory of recovery not submitted to the trial
court could not be considered on appeal); Nelson v. Newman, 583
P.2d 601 (Utah 1978) (where plaintiff did not pray for
recission in trial court the issue of recission could not be
raised on appeal); First Equity Corp. v. Utah State University,
554 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975) (an appellant cannot ordinarily raise
for the first time a theory on appeal different from that
presented to the court below).

Accordingly, this Court should

not consider the unjust enrichment/restitution claim raised by
Petty in its brief.
B.

Masonry Equipment has not be^n Unjustly Enriched
since it Paid in Full for th£ Subject Forklift.

The record does not support Petty*s assertion that
Masonry Equipment was unjustly enriched in any manner
whatsoever.

The evidence is uncontroverteqi that Masonry

-15-

Equipment paid $35,000 for the subject forklift to CS&G at a
time when Petty had no possessory interest in the subject
forklift*

(Deposition of Del Lewis at 26). Masonry

Equipment's subsequent rental of the forklift and its
subsequent resale in no way enriched Masonry Equipment
unjustly.

As discussed above, Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-9-311

(1953) gave CS&G the right to sell its interest in the
forklift*

Masonry Equipment was not unjustly enriched.

Any

damage suffered by Petty was a result of Petty*s failure to
protect its rights once CS&G defaulted in 1981, not Masonry
Equipment's rightful conduct in relation to the forklift from
1979 to 1981.
III.

PETTY IS NOT ENTITLED TO REPLEVIN DAMAGES
In its brief, Petty asserts that it is entitled to

damages for replevin.

An action for replevin does not lie and

unless there is either a wrongful taking or a wrongful
detention damages for replevin cannot be awarded.
Stratton, 22 Utah 2d 190, 450 P.2d 463 (1969).

Pugh v.

As discussed in

Argument I above, the facts are uncontroverted that there was
neither a wrongful taking nor a wrongful detention in this
case.

At the time Masonry Equipment obtained possession of the

subject forklift in 1979 Petty had no possessory interest in
the forklift.

There was therefore no wrongful taking.
-16-

By the

time Petty asserted a possessory interest in 1983, Masonry
Equipment no longer had possession of the i forklift.
therefore no wrongful detention.

There was

Thus, nq replevin damages can

be awarded to Petty.
CONCLUSION
A review of applicable case law dictates that no
action for conversion can exist against Masonry Equipment, a
third-party, good faith purchaser of secured property, unless
Petty 1) has a right to possess the subject forklift by reason
of default by CS&G; 2) makes demand upon tjhe Masonry Equipment
for return of the secured forklift; and 3) receives an absolute
refusal from Masonry Equipment.

Upon such demand the holder of

a perfected security interest is entitled to repossession of
the secured property from a third-party purchaser.

In the

instant action, Petty1s demand for the return of the subject
forklift was satisfied by Masonry Equipment's recovery and
delivery of the forklift to Petty.
Similarly, no relief should be grinted on Petty1s
claim of unjust enrichment since this claiijn was not raised in
the district court and the facts do not support such a claim.
Likewise, since there was no wrongful taking or wrongful
detention of the subject forklift, Petty1s claim for replevin
damages is without merit.
-17-

The pleadings, admissions and deposition of Del Lewis
demonstrate no evidence of a conversion of the subject forklift
by Masonry Equipment.

The absence of a genuine issue of

material fact regarding the acquisition, use and disposition of
the subject forklift by Masonry Equipment dictates that the
district court's Order, granting Masonry Equipment's Motion for
Summary Judgment, should be affirmed on appeal*
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^

day of August, 1985.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

~^l &»%$.

By

L. R.Curtis, Jr.
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 5 ^ ^ day of August, 1985,
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, by first class mail,
four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS to:
Ralph C. Petty
Attorney for Appellant
721 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ADDENDUM

Petty Motor Lease, Inc.

601 SOUTH MAIN
SA£T LABS CITY, UTAH / 84111

"fitmt
11-1

i\inr££ttt£ttt m*d* *od eater*1 ,at0 ^Slsi-*** «

OTOR LXA8S. INC., a corporation. hertlnafUr called Owner, and

PHONE 363-2643

February
C

S

EXHIBIT "A"

&

G

i>78 . by ^ betwatn PETTO

M a S O n r y

„

_

_

of

5487 Arches Dr., Kearns, Utah 84118
ereia eaUtd Ustr, WX7MS88XTH:
Tfcat Owner h e r e b y l e a s e e to User and U»er hires from Owner, for u s e "only within the Continental U n i t s of the United Sfeetes, the following do*
eribed property, to*wit:

1978 Swinger Forkliftmodel 300, Ser. No. 300637

for s term of
19

Oo

*^

months eommeneiac on the £ l S t

day of

F e b .

19 7 8

, and ending on the 2 0 t h

day of

"Feb.

which l e a s e shall be strictly under the following terms and conditions:

1. U s e r s g r e e s to pay to Owner as rental for the u s e of said property the ram of * 7 3 5 - B R
« p l u s 5 % u s e t a x p*r m o n t h , payable in
advance «t the office of Owner in Salt Lake City. Utah. If any rental payment i s not paid within 10 o a y s after m e due date thereof, this l e a a e s h e U
automatically expire. Said monthly payment will permit User a maximum mileage of 20,000 m i l e s per year.
Additional rail*ege will be charged for at the rate of
r

*°

per mile.

to

. . I°.F** •«*•••
deposit with Owner the sum of S „ ^ i . " ^ Y r.Ofl be held by Owner, without Interest, until mil-terms of this l e a s e have been
faithfully performed and the property returned to Owner In a satisfactory condition,
whereupon said deposit shaU be returned to User. However, if
U s e r v i o l a t e s any condition ot this agreement Owner may retain such portion of s a i d deposit as may be n e c e s s a r y to compensate Owner for the l o s s
or damage caused by such violation, and should the sum deposit* d be insufficient t© compensate Owner for the l o e s or damage caused by such violation. User agrees to pay tho deficiency to Owner.
3. U s e r e g r e s s to continually maintain s a i d property in good condition and repair and that whenever p o s s i b l e the maintenance of said property
shall be performed at Owner's designated shop, st User's e x p e n s e , s x c s p t that if User operates a repair shop, work may be performed at such shop,
but repair or replacement parts required for such maintenance shall be purchased from Owner's designated agency at prices prevailing at that time
for such parts.
4. In addition to the oayments hereinabove provided. User s g r e e s to pay Owner an amount equal to the sum of all registration f e e s . l i c e n s e f e e s ,
property t o x e s or other f e e s and t a x e s , snd any other charges l e v i e d e g s i n s t s a i d property or i t s u s e during the term of this l e a s e , it being under*
stood that such sum s s Is paid by User to Owner under this paragraph shall be paid by Owner «e such charges are l e v i e d or a s s e s s e d , snd should
edditionel amounts be l e v i e d or a s s e s s e d s g s i n s t said property or i t s u s e . User s g r e e s to pay the same to Owner upon demand. User also a g r e e s to
pay or discharge the c o s t of traffic citations or parking t i c k e t s a s s e s s e d against User or the property dunng the term of this l e a s e .
Sc (
U S e r
^ agrees to maintain during the term of this leas® not l e s s thanl2S r 000prQfisrty damage insurance and $ 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 / 3 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 publ i c liability lnaurance, which iaaurance shall provide protection for Owner snd User. The (^JUJS&JZ^)
agrees to maintain during the term of tbie
l e a a e . fire, theft, comprehensive snd $100 d e d u c t i b l e c o l l i s i o n insurance on th*> above described property, which insurance shall provide protection
for Owner sad User s s their Interests may appear. In caae of damage User s g r e e s to pay the first $100 of the c o s t of replacement or repairs and eU
damage mot covered by s u c h i n s u r a n c e Owner may have in effect st the commencement of this Lease fire, theft, comprehenaive and $100 deductible
c o l l i s i o n insurance. If U s e r furnishes Owner with evidence of setisfactory lnaurance coverag e within fifteen daya from tho commencement of tfec
l e a a e . Owner's lnaurance policy shall be t e r m i n a t e d with no e x p e n s e to User. However, if e v i d e n c e of satisfactory insurance coverage h a s not bee©
famished by U s e r within fifteen days of the commencement of this l e a s e . User shall pay to Owner the total premium under such lnaurance p o l i c y of
Owner and that policy may be kept In full force mnd effect during the term of this i e e s e . In addition. User specifically a g r e e s to defend and hold
barmieec Owner from any claim or liability whatsoever arising from the use of the property herein l e a s e d during the term oTtftle l e a s e , including
Owner's N e g l i g e n c e . Should U s e r now or in the future become an "'assigned risk'* or should s higher than average insurance premium otherwise? b«
required, and if Owner h a s herein sgreed to maintain insurance coverage, u s e r a g r e e s to pay any additional premium upon dessando
Oo T h i s L e a s e may be terminated by User at any time dunng the period of the L e a s e , or. it u s e r n e i « t « « any e« «*e ce«ae ot this screesaeaL,
Owner may, without n o t i c e , terminate this L e a s e . If this L e a s e i s terminated by either Owner or User for sny reason or expires as provided in parsZ
graph l, hereof. U s e r agreea to pay to Owner any and all peat due payments or other sums then due under the terms of this L e a s e , Including, but not
limited to, the c o s t of repairs required to bring the property to good condition plus the final l e a s e payment in full, snd, in addition thereto, to pay
45 por cent of the monthly rental multiplied by the number ot months the l e e s e has yet to nsn9 which sum la to compensate Owner (or the greater
coats and d e p r e d a t i o n oceuring during the first part of the L e a s e s s eompsred to the l e s t part of the L e a a e .
To Upon expiration or termination of this agreement User shall surrender the unit to Owner in good mechanical condition and repair, with tires
having as l e a s t 50 per cent of original tread and free from body damage, scratched or chipped paint or torn or frayed upholstry . Any e x p e n s e bv
Owner to bring unit to the above described condition shall be paid for by Uaer.
t . [f U s e r f a i l s to make payments when due, or If User fails to perform
which the property unit Is kept, without notice or demand, and remove the same
t r e s p a s s or damage resulting from such entry or removal. User s g r e e s to pay
by Owner In enforcement of i t s rights under this agreement snd s g r e e s to pay
wh i due.

sny other condition of this l e a s e . Owner may enter the premises upon
with or without p r o c e s s of law and Uaer hereby w a i v e s any action for
ell c o s t s and e x p e n s e s including reasonable attorney's f e e s , Ineozrwd
interest at the h i g h e s t rats allowed by law upon all amounts not paid

9. U s e r s e c e p t s the property In Its present condition mad acknowledges that there srs ae warrantees express or implied s s to the condition,
su: ibiilty > - ^usiity or performance of the property.
EXECUTED the day s u d year first above written.
PETTY M O T O f J ^ A S E , INC.
By
Its,

In consideration of the execution of the s b o v e L e a s e by Motor L e a s e , Inc., we, the undersigned, jointly and severally guarantee payments ot sM
amounts due or to become due under the sbove L e a s e and guarantee portorxnmneo of all the terms thereof and consent to any e x t e n s i o n of time for
payments ot performance.
E X E C U T E D this

day of

This lease will pay out in full if
payments are made as called for over
60 months, and property will become

,

1 9 6 _

•••w*w«t%y w a i e \ i f < * i y f .

qrifj t u « Name PiMtl and address<es)

2. Secured ParTy<iesl and addren(es)

I & G Masonry 87-0303663 Petty Motor Lease Inc.*
601 South Main St.
7 Arches Dr.
irns.^ Lttah 84118
Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111
c. or f to. U3. Number
87 0222742
'inanong statement covert the following types (or items) of property:

1 Swinger Forklift, Model 200
Ser. No, 200143
1 Swinger Forklift, Model 300
Ser. No. 300637

For Filing Officer (Oate, Time, Number,
and Filing Office)

* 4 S8 78

& Gross Sales Price of
Collateral

0AV?r • vnife^u
5. Awgnee^gflS^oredrtrty^d-Addreastes)

S 20..9.0.0..00

44/132. 30—
.Sales
s 1.045.00State
of

"Hr,Mrte

Walker -Bank- 3c-TrarstXT
o.
1030 E . 21st South - , £
Salt.Lake Cijy, Utah 8410)

few 11 /Zi2fH'78 ••'

Utah
This statement is filed without the debtor's signature to perfect a security interest in collateral. (check(x]if so)
•

already subiect to a security interest in another jurisdiction when it was brought into this state,

Q

which is proceeds of the original collateral described above m which a security interest was perfected:

HfcC£i V £ D

:k g j »f covered: [ j Proceeds of Collateral are also covered. QProducts of Collateral are also covered. No. of additional Sheets presented:
The secured party is Q i s not J

a seller or purchase money tender of the collateral

Filed with:

%>XO

A

Office
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY

«y.PFTTY MOTOR LEASE INC. by
xgnatu

Signatureis) of Secured Party

STANDARD FORM • FORM UCC-1.
APPROVEO BY CLYOE L. MILLER. SECRETARY OP STATE. FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
Filing Officer Copy • Alphabetical
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EXHIBIT "D"

Utah Code Annotated
70A-9-311. Alienability of debtor's rights — Judicial process. The
debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred
(by way of sale, creation of a security interest, attachment, levy, garnishment or other judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the security
agreement prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer constitute a
default.

EXHIBIT "E"

Utah Code Annotated
70A-9-503. Secured party's right to take possession after default.
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the
peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the
secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make
it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured
party which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a
secured party may render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under section 70A-9-504. If a secured party
elects to proceed by process of law he may proceed by writ of replevin or
otherwise.

